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S/P-Mr. Hargrove

Europe

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

To : G - Mr. Matthews

From : NEA - Mr. Byroade

Subject : An Alternate Approach to Middle East Defense Arrangements.

DISCUSSION

There have been a number of reports recently of Arab resistance to MEDO and increasing evidence that no approach to the Arab states seeking their participation in Middle East defense arrangements is likely to be successful unless the Arab Collective Security Pact is taken into account. The attached memorandum suggests a possible device for meeting the difficulties posed by the existence of the ACSP and for enlisting Arab cooperation in Middle East defense arrangements, while at the same time preserving the essential elements of the position which the MEDO sponsors have agreed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memorandum as a basis for informal discussions with the other sponsoring powers, such discussions to be aimed at the development of an agreed procedure for enlisting Arab cooperation.

May 13

Despatch sent S. Dept. with the JSSC.

CONCURRENCES

EUR

S/P

Memorandum shown JSSC 5/5/53. They saw no objection to its use as stated above.

Doc has suggestion shelving this until Clay's return. JF

Attachment:

Memorandum entitled "An Alternate Approach to Middle East Defense Arrangements."

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/28/78
PER NOTES OFFICE NEA
720115

NEA:ABDespitocgrams

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MEMORANDUM

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

1. Recent statements of Arab leaders emphasizing the primary responsibility of the Arab states for the defense of the Near East and the fact that arrangements for such defense have already been provided in the Arab Collective Security Pact, taken in conjunction with the actual terms of the Arab Collective Security Pact itself, suggest that efforts to negotiate for the establishment of MEDO bilaterally with the individual Arab states and without reference to the ACSP may well prove unsuccessful.

2. Unless measures are taken to coordinate the two organizations, entry by the Arab states into MEDO would require their disregard of fundamental provisions of the ACSP amounting to a repudiation of the instrument. Article 10 of the ACSP provides that no signatory power shall enter into any international agreement which may be contradictory to the treaty. The Military Annex of the Pact provides that under the control of the Joint Defense Council a permanent military commission shall prepare military plans for the defense of the signatory states, organize the exchange of training missions, submit proposals to increase the effectiveness of forces, etc. Since the MEDO proposals would assign these functions to another body, organized under different authority, agreement by Arab states to enter MEDO would appear, prima facie, to constitute a violation of the ACSP as now drafted.

3. The Department

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3. The Department of State is of the opinion that account must be taken of this problem and that an effort should be made to develop a solution which would at the same time satisfy the Arab leaders and preserve the essential objectives sought by the Western powers in sponsoring MEDO. From the point of view of the MEDO sponsors, what is required is an organization which will be adapted to the performance of the functions allotted to the Planning Group in the present MEDO proposals; which will be responsive to Western guidance; and which will make possible the eventual evolution of a command organization under Western leadership. For the United States, it is also essential that no formal treaty obligations be involved. Although it is impossible to predict with assurance what will be satisfactory from the point of view of the Arab states, recent statements by responsible leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria seem to indicate that the Governments of these states desire to cooperate with the Western powers in defense arrangements, provided such cooperation will bring them military aid and can be effected on a basis which will neither expose them to charges that they have capitulated to the West nor involve a loss of face for the Arab League.

4. In the view of the Department of State, the suggestion of the Iraqi leaders that the West should cooperate with the Arab states by adhering to an amended version of the ACSP does not, for the following reasons, provide an acceptable solution to the problem: a) The ACSP is an integral part of the Arab League and its several organs are ultimately responsible to the Arab League Council; b) Adherence to the ACSP would involve sweeping commitments amounting to a full military alliance with the Arab states which the United States is not at present prepared

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prepared to undertake; c) The Israeli Government and people are convinced that the ACSP is dedicated to the destruction of Israel; d) Even though the MEDO sponsoring powers, including Turkey, were prepared to accede to the ACSP, it is doubtful that certain non-Arab Middle East states, such as Pakistan, which could make a significant contribution to area defense, would be willing to become parties to the treaty; e) The general character of the treaty and the organization it establishes would tend to prevent the development of a command organization on a workable basis. Theoretically, it might be possible to cure most of these faults by means of amendments to the ACSP. This operation, however, would involve a complete and radical revision of the commitments undertaken, the organization established and the functions performed under the present terms of the treaty. Proposals to this could hardly be expected to induce Arab cooperation.

5. In the view of the Department of State, a possible solution of the problem may lie in the marked similarity of the Military Annex of the ACSP to the MEDO concept as presently agreed by the sponsors. Whereas most of the provisions of the Treaty proper are fundamentally unacceptable, the Military Annex establishes organs for military planning and prescribes functions which are closely similar to the structure and functions of MEDO as agreed by the sponsors. Annex A, attached, sets forth a comparative analysis of the Military Annex of ACSP and the draft MEDO document as presently agreed.

6. It seems to the Department of State that the Military Annex to the ACSP might be accepted by the MEDO sponsors as a basis for negotiating

negotiating with the Arab states for the establishment of an inclusive Middle East planning group, with similar functions, as part of an organization which might be called by some name other than the MEDO. It would be plausible to argue from the organization of the ACSP and the similarity of the functions of the broader Planning Group to those of the Military Commission, that such a group should receive guidance and direction from a superior body composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the Arab and Western participating states. These proposals relate only to tactics and do not affect the substance of the proposals on which agreement has been reached among the MEDO sponsors. The Organization these proposals are intended to produce would be identical in all essentials with that proposed in the MEDO draft. Like MEDO, it would exist alongside but separate from the ACSP, with its own lines of organizational authority distinct from those of the Arab League organs. No formal link between the two organizations is proposed, though for tactical reasons it might be desirable in the terms of reference of the new organization to make some complimentary reference to the ACSP.

7. In the view of the Department of State, there would be certain definite advantages to be derived if the sponsoring powers were to propose to the Arab states that the Military Annex of the ACSP rather than the MEDO draft be made the basis of negotiation with respect to the functions of the broader planning group. Such a proposal would at the outset make suitable acknowledgment of the ACSP and of the Arab initiative in establishing it, while avoiding the suspicion which a Western draft would inevitably arouse, and would simplify the task of the Arab leaders in making the adherence of the Arab states to the new

organization

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organization appear consistent with the ACSP. However, for maximum effectiveness, the proposal should appear to originate on the Arab side. The Department is requesting the advice of United States Missions in the Arab capitals as to the possibility of stimulating certain of the Arab leaders to produce the proposal as their own.

8. From the Arab point of view, even though the above procedures were followed, some conflict between the inclusive organization and the ACSP might still remain. However, the above steps would point the direction of a complete solution which the Arabs themselves might effect by an amendment to the ACSP authorizing member states to participate in other organizations which had common objectives with the ACSP and which would assist the Arab states in perfecting defense arrangements in the Near East.

9. The foregoing proposals, designed to appeal to the Arab states, would doubtless increase the apprehensions of Israel which have already been strongly voiced in response to reports concerning MEDO plans. The Department of State is convinced that the adoption of such an approach to the Arab states would make imperative a parallel approach to Israel. In this approach it would be desirable to emphasize the following points: a) The MEDO sponsors have changed neither their objectives nor their concept of the type of defense organization they are prepared to support in the Middle East, and the acceptance of the Military Annex of the ACSP as a basis for negotiation with the Arab States, rather than proposals the sponsors might themselves put forward, will not be permitted to affect the interests of Israel adversely; b) The new organization will be separate from the Arab League and will in no way lend itself to Arab pressure on Israel.

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on Israel. On the contrary, it will be directed exclusively at developing defenses against aggression from outside the area. To the extent the organization is successful, it should contribute to the atrophy of the ACSP; c) A renewal of hostilities within the Near East area must be avoided, and this consideration will continue to govern the signatories of the Tripartite Declaration in supplying arms assistance to the Arab States and Israel; d) The sponsoring powers are convinced that Israel can contribute significantly to Middle East defense, and it will be an objective of their policy to promote conditions which will make it possible for Israel to become a full member of the regional defense organization. The use of the ACSP Military Annex as a basis for the initial negotiations should not increase the difficulty of later membership for Israel, since the new organization would be separate from ACSP.

10. The Department of State suggests that the above and any other proposals for dealing with the problems posed by the ACSP and Arab resistance to MEDO should be considered urgently with a view to developing an alternative approach to the establishment of inclusive defense arrangements in the Middle East. Decisions concerning the use of such possible alternatives would, of course, have to be made in the light of the developing situation in the Middle East, and perhaps particularly in Egypt. Prior agreement by the sponsors on such alternatives will be necessary, however, to enable negotiators to move rapidly when and if the situation warrants.

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ANNEX A

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF NATO COMPARED TO THOSE DESCRIBED IN MILITARY ANNEX OF ACSP AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL

The Organization of the two bodies may be charted as follows:

ORGANIZATION



The parallel

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The parallel functions of the two bodies are indicated by the following presentation:

MEDO PLANNING GROUP	ARAB PERMANENT MILITARY COMMISSION
FUNCTIONS	
SIMILARITIES	
a. Draw up plans for the defense of the Middle East; make plans for the operations in war of all forces allocated to the defense of the area.	a. Prepare plans against armed aggression. Study various facilities and aids which each state should provide.
b. Provide Middle East States training and advice; reduce such deficiencies as exist in the organization and capacity for defense of the area; coordinate requests of Middle East States for arms and equipment.	b. Submit proposals for arming, organization and training, to increase efficiency of armed forces; organize exchange of training missions; propose organization and size of forces of each state; prepare data and statistics concerning resources and military potential of each State.
DIFFERENCES	
	c. Prepare plans for joint exercises and manouvers and carry them out.
	d. Submit proposals for economic development to promote defense effort.